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INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 1984, Congress passed the Retirement Equity
Act (REA). Signed into law on August 23, 1984, this Act had, as
one of its purposes, the clarification of the confusion concerning
the anti-alienation rules originally adopted ten years earlier. Unfortunately, this most laudable endeavor, carried out with very
limited objectives, was without a view towards the creation of a
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monthly feature on new developments in taxation appearing in the CAMPBELL LAW
OBSERVER.
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comprehensive and workable statutory framework.
As will be seen, the creation of the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) by the REA, establishes an island of relative
certainty. This island sits, however, in a sea of assumption and
supposition leaving plan administrators, participants, and the
courts with little congressional guidance on the spendthrift standards to be applied.

II.

REASONS FOR AN ANTI-ALIENATION RULE

The ability to create a beneficial interest in a trust which cannot be reached by the beneficiary's creditors has long been recognized in English common law.' Such "spendthrift" provisions are
also recognized by many American jurisdictions, either in the form
of a prohibition against alienation contained in the trust itself, or
as in England, in the form of a cessor clause causing the termination of the interest of a beneficiary whose share is about to be
alienated.'
The funding vehicle for most retirement plans is a trust. Prior
to 1974, such trusts were construed in accordance with the laws of
the applicable state or other jurisdiction. Some plans were drawn
with a spendthrift provision and some were not. Of those plans
with spendthrift provisions, some contained one type of clause and
some another, depending upon the requirements of the local jurisdiction. Congress, obviously not satisfied with this patchwork quilt
of spendthrift protection adopted as part of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), its own anti-alienation
rules. 3 An ERISA spendthrift requirement is contained in both Title I and Title II of the Act and has been codified in section
401(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code.' In its legislative history,
1. A. SCOTT, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 282 (1960).
2. Id.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, §
206, 88 Stat. 864 and § 1021, 88 Stat. 935 (1974) [hereinafter Act].
4. ACT, § 206.(d)(1). Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. "(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection, there shall not be taken into account any voluntary
and revocable assignment of not to exceed ten percent of any benefit payment, or
of any irrevocable assignment or alienation of benefits executed before the date of
enactment of this Act. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any assignment
or alienation made for the purposes of defraying plan administration costs. For
purposes of this paragraph, a loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not
be treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by the particihttp://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss1/2
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Congress stated that the reason for the adoption of the spendthrift
rule was to prevent the assignment or alienation of benefits in order to insure that ". . . the employee's accrued benefits are actually available for retirement plan purposes,..."
Prior to modifications that will be discussed later, the statute
itself was quite simple and, with a few stated exceptions, 6 provided
that "[a] trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan, of which said trust is a part, provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. ' '7 This superficial simplicity is, however, actually the principal reason for the unacceptable and unnecessary complexity. As
can be seen from the statutory language, the spendthrift rule was
pant's accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the Revenue Code of
1954 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of section 4975(d)(1) of
such Code." ACT, § 1021 (c) provides that retirement benefits may not be assigned
or alienated. Section 401(a) is amended by inserting after paragraph (12) the following new paragraph: "(13) A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under
this section unless the plan of which said trust is a part provides that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated. For purposes of the
preceding sentence, there shall not be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed ten percent of any benefit payment made by
any participant who is receiving benefits under the plan unless the assignment or
alienation is made for purposes of defraying plan administration costs. For purposes of this paragraph a loan made to a participant or beneficiary shall not be
treated as an assignment or alienation if such loan is secured by the participant's
accrued nonforfeitable benefit and is exempt from the tax imposed by section
4975 (relating to tax on prohibited transactions) by reason of section 4975(d)(1).
This paragraph shall take effect on January 1, 1976 and shall not apply to assignments which were irrevocable on the date of the enactment of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974."
5. H.R. 12855, 32nd Cong., 2nd Sess., P.H. Committee Reports, Paragraph
93141.
6. The prohibition does not bar arrangements on plan termination for the
recovery under 4045(b) of ERISA of sums otherwise distributed to retired or former participants. It does not bar arrangements for withholding local, state or federal taxes on overpayments nor does it bar the Federal Government from enforcing a federal tax levy. (Treasury Reg 1.401 (a)-13(b)(2). This prohibition also does
not bar arrangements for the transfer of funds from one plan to another or to an
account for the benefit of the participant or the participant and his spouse. It also
does not bar the pledging of the account as collateral security for a plan loan. In
the case of U.S. v. Southwestern Life Insurance Company, 81-2 USTC 9697 (N.D.
Tex. 1981) the court seemed to say that a Keogh plan, created by the debtor for
his own benefit, was not allowed to avail itself of the spendthrift rules under
Texas law and therefore, a levy for unpaid federal taxes, could be made. No mention of the pre-emption rule was made by the court.
7. IRC § 401(a)(13)(1986).
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directive at the preparer of the plan and required inclusion of
qualifying language in the plan itself. Unfortunately, Congress did
not give any guidance as to what language would suffice to meet
this requirement. Was it the intent of the drafters to merely insure
that each plan would contain a spendthrift clause to be interpreted
in accordance with local law or did Congress desire to create its
own spendthrift rules eliminating local interpretation?
As previously stated, many jurisdictions, such as North Carolina, have spendthrift rules which are virtually self-executing.' A
trust beneficiary simply forfeits the right to his benefits upon an
attempted voluntary or involuntary alienation. 9 The trustee can
then be given discretionary authority to distribute the benefits to
the plan participant or their dependents, thus preserving the fund
for its intended purposes.'
Immediately, after the passage of ERISA, drafters of qualified
retirement plans were faced with the question of whether they
could still utilize such a cessor clause, thus again making the
spendthrift rule self-executing. The answer to this question was a
categorical "no." The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) offices, upon
reviewing the qualified plans, were virtually unanimous in their determination that the federal anti-alienation rules preempted state
law. 1 Furthermore, the IRS, determined that a cessor clause would
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-115 (1979) provides in reference to the alienability
of a beneficiary's interest and spendthrift trusts that: "a) Except as provided in
subsection (b) hereof, all estates or interests of trust beneficiaries are alienable
either voluntarily or involuntarily to the same extent as are legal estates or interests or a similar nature. (b) Subsection (a) hereof shall not apply to a beneficiary's
estate or interest in any one or any combination of one or more of the trusts
described below, in which the beneficiary's estate or interest shall not be alienable
either voluntarily or involuntarily. (1) Discretionary Trust. - A trust wherein the
amount to be received by the beneficiary, including whether or note the beneficiary is to receive anything at all, is within the discretion of the trustee. (2) Support Trust. - A trust wherein the trustee has no duty to pay or distribute any
particular amount to the beneficiary, but has only a duty to pay or distribute to
the beneficiary, or to apply on behalf of the beneficiary such sums as the trustee
shall, in his discretion, determine are appropriate for the support, education or
maintenance of the beneficiary. (3) Protective Trust. - A trust wherein the creating instrument provides that the interest of the beneficiary shall cease if a. The
beneficiary alienates or attempts to alienate that interest; or b. Any creditor attempts to reach the beneficiary's interest by attachment, levy or otherwise; or c.
The beneficiary becomes insolvent or bankrupt." (1979, c. 180, s. 1.)
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Internal Revenue Service did not have a published position on this

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss1/2
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violate ERISA provisions, preventing divestiture of a participant's
12
vested interest.
In summary, Congress had eliminated the self-executing aspects of most spendthrift laws by adopting very general language
directed only to the drafter of the plan. Since ERISA expressly
preempts state laws applicable to retirement plan benefits, 3 drafters of plans could no longer resort to the prior state interpretations
of spendthrift provisions and were, therefore, left with the unanswered question of what Congress intended as the guidelines for
the application of its spendthrift rule. Did Congress intend to create its own invisible shield over plan benefits, protecting these resources by the force of federal law or did Congress intend for the
Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Service to adopt
regulations setting forth precise guidelines on what a qualifying
plan spendthrift provision would say? With little legislative history
for guidance, practitioners were left with only one resort; to the
ephemeral and often elusive judicially determined intent of
Congress.
Unfortunately, nearly fourteen years after the passage of
ERISA, little progress has been made in determining precisely
what Congress desired section 401(a)(13) to accomplish. 14 If the
drafters merely intended to require some form of state qualified
spendthrift clause in each plan, they missed their mark by a very
wide margin. If, however, it was the intention of the legislature to
spark a storm of protest and a plethora of both federal and state
litigation, their success is unqualified. Only by the introduction of
the Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) in 1984, has Congress given any element of certainty to this area of the law."6 The
purpose of this article will be to describe the current status of the
anti-alienation rules, including the areas that are relatively certain,
such as the QDRO and other areas where enormous uncertainty
still exists.
point. Reviewers, however, verbally communicated to persons who had submitted
plans for determination letter that they would not approve plans containing a
cessor clause but would require general language prohibiting alienation and assignment of plan benefits.
12. Id.
13. Act, supra note 3, § 514, at 897.
14. IRC § 401(a)(13)(1986).
15. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
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DISCOVERY OF THE IMPLIED EXCEPTION

Perhaps an early hint that an invisible shield over plan benefits would not be provided came when the Treasury Department
began to consider its own regulations. These regulations interpreted the statutory language and attempted to define the terms
"assignment" and "alienation" as follows:
(i) Any arrangement providing for the payment to the employer
of plan benefits which otherwise would be due the participant
under the plan; and
(ii) Any direct or indirect arrangement (whether revocable or irrevocable) whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a right or interest enforceable against the plan in, or to, all
or any part of a plan benefit payment which is, or may become,
payable to the participant or beneficiary."6

Few would take umbrage with the foregoing definition of two commonly used words. Before reaching this point, however, the Treasury regulations take poetic license and protect the fisc first. Notwithstanding the foregoing definitions, the regulations state that
the prohibited alienation of plan benefits does not occur in the
case of a seizure of plan assets pursuant to a federal tax levy or
pursuant to a judgment resulting from any unpaid tax assessment. 17 All creditors are created equally except that some creditors
are more equal than others. Finding justification for the exemption
of federal tax levies and liens in either the statute or the legislative
history will be very difficult to say the least.
Notwithstanding the obvious directive nature of the statutory
language, it should be carefully noted that the regulations do not
attempt to define what language must or may be included in the
plan's anti-alienation sections. The regulations attempt to define
the terms "assignment" and "alienation" as if the statute itself
prohibited these events and was self-executing. Once the quantum
leap is made from a spendthrift provision requirement in the plan,
to a statutory prohibition against assignment, the need for a federal doctrine of spendthrift law becomes apparent.
IV.

EARLY COURT DECISIONS

The ink was barely dry on ERISA when litigants first began to
raise the possiblility of an unspoken but implied exception to the
16. Treasury Reg. 1.401(a)-13(c)(1981).
17. Treasury Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(2)(1981).
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anti-alienation rules. Many cases began to wind their way through
the various courts and their conclusions literally covered the spectrum of possible interpretations.1 8 The conclusions ranged from assertive determinations that no involuntary seizure of plan assets to
enforce money judgments was permitted, to an equally forceful
conclusion that ERISA allows the garnishment or attachment of
pension benefits to satisfy virtually any liabilities of the plan
participant.1 9
The former conclusion was reached on December 16, 1976, less
than two years after the effective date of the applicable ERISA
language, in a decision by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan. In General Motors Corporation v.
Townsend,2 0 the district court held that involuntary seizures of
plan assets to satisfy judgments was prohibited.2" The ruling arose
from a fairly simple proceeding to enforce a domestic relations order requiring payment of plan benefits. General Motors Corporation, as plan administrator, attempted to enjoin such a
garnishment.2 2
All facts involved in the case, other than the actual garnishment, occurred prior to the passage ERISA. The case concerned a
1974 divorce decree ordering the payment of one-half of the plan
assets from a General Motors Stock Savings Plan to the participant's former spouse.2 3 The plan administrator had transferred the
stock directly to the participant who, for no apparent reason, disobeyed the court order and gave his ex-wife nothing.2 " A writ of
garnishment was then obtained which directed the National Bank
of Detroit, trustee of another General Motors plan (the General
Motors Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees), to pay an
equivalent amount to the plaintiff-spouse.2
It was the position of the plan administrator that such a garnishment was not permitted by ERISA and that state law was preempted in this regard.2 6 The district court agreed, concluding that
Congress had clearly intended to prohibit involuntary assignments;
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Notes 20 and 28.
Id.
468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich., 1976).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 469.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 469.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988

7

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:29

that the plan had been properly amended to comply with the
ERISA requirements; and that the garnishment in question was a
prohibited involuntary assignment. 27 The court further concluded
that the preemption provision of ERISA controlled this case and
preempted the state's right2 8 to garnish retirement benefits to enforce the money judgment.
This case clearly represented a high water mark for proponents of the "invisible shield doctrine" and for their interpretation
of the spendthrift provisions of ERISA. Under the doctrine described in General Motors Corporation v. Townsend, it was as if
Congress had exempted plan benefits from the reach of state court
orders since, according to the Michigan court, this is clearly what
Congress had intended. 9
Perhaps the other end of the spectrum for interpretation of
the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA was reached in a decision
of the New York Court of Appeals in 1979. The case, National
Bank of North America v. The InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 3 Pension and Vacation Funds,3" affirmed a lower court decision allowing the plaintiff bank to levy on
vested pension benefits in order to collect a $1,478.10 judgment
previously obtained against the retired plan participant.3 1 The
judgment bore no relation to the pension plan and did not involve
a question of family support. In fact, the question of the judgment
was in effect rendered moot since it was paid from other funds
prior to the decision of the court.32 The court went on to render its
opinion, however, because of the importance of the question
presented.
In its decision, the highest court of the State of New York
carefully analyzed the preemption provisions of ERISA and concluded that the provisions did not apply since the case did not involve anything relating to retirement plans per se.3 The instant
27. Id. at 470.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 469.
30. 419 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1979). This case no longer represents the view of the
New York Courts. In light of subsequent decisions and legislation, the New York
Courts now recognize that ERISA preempts state law even in the case of attachment of assets pursuant to a New York Criminal Statute. Morgenthau v.
Citisource, Inc. 513 N.Y.S. 2d 429 (1987).
31. Nat'l Bank at 129.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 129.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss1/2
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case was determined to concern the ". . fundamental problems of
enforcing money judgments, ' 34 an area not intended to be preempted by the adoption of federal pension legislation.
The New York court was well aware of the decision in General
Motors,35 but concluded that the State of New York had a vital
interest in enforcing its own money judgments and this interest
was unrelated to the purposes of ERISA.3 6 The court went on to
say something by using the words that appeared to be of the utmost significance in interpreting the statute. Apparently these
words never reached the ears of Congress. The New York court
simply concluded that if Congress had intended to bar execution,
levies, attachments, and garnishments, Congress knew perfectly
well how to do so and what language to use.3 7 In fact, Congress had
used specific language to that effect as part of the Social Security
Act, 38 the Railroad Retirement Act,39 and statutes dealing with the
payment of veterans' benefits.40 In other words, it was the view of
the New York Court of Appeals that the statutory language contained in ERISA prohibited voluntary assignments. Under this
view, however, ERISA allowed the seizure of benefits pursuant to
proper judicial proceedings unrelated to the administration of retirement plans.4
V.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT EXCEPTION

In the analysis of National Bank of North America, the New
York court cited as authority a growing body of case law which did
not come to the far-reaching conclusions of the New York case.42
Instead the cases cited held that Congress intended to create an
exception to the anti-assignment rule where payment of marital
and dependent's support obligations were involved.43 The court
cited American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Merry44 for
the specific proposition, that the anti-alienation provision does not
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
468 F. Supp. 466.
Nat'l Bank, 419 N.Y.S.2d 130.
Id. at 131.
42 U.S.C. § 407 (1982).
45 U.S.C. § 231M (1982).
38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982).
419 N.Y.S. 2d at 134 (1979).
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 132.
592 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1979).
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bar garnishment for certain purposes.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Merry was
handed down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in January
of 1979. The case involved a retired employee of AT&T who had
apparently avoided a New York support order by taking up residence in the Bahamas."5 The court began its analysis by reversing
the emphasis of IRC section 401(a)(13).4 1 As previously noted,
401(a)(13) requires a certain type of language to be included in the
plan. The court of appeals cited the statute for the proposition,
however, that ". . . assignment or alienation of benefits is also pro4' 7
hibited if a pension plan is to be considered a tax qualified plan.
The court of appeals went on to conclude that, notwithshanding the clear language of the statute, and the lack of any contrary
legislative history, there was not sufficient grounds to ". . . infer
that Congress meant to preclude the ancient family law right of
maintenance and support and the issuance of process to enforce
that right."4 8 The court criticized 9 the district court in General
Motors Corporation v. Townsend 50 which had, according to the
Second Circuit, erroneously relied upon the explicit language of
the statute. 1
The AT&T case exemplifies the multiplicity of decisions that
preceded the passage of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984.51 It is
not the purpose of this article to reiterate the positions set forth in
those decisions since most of these questions have been rendered
moot by the Retirement Equity Act. It is sufficient to say, however,
that these cases indicated a clear steadfastness by the various federal and state courts in refusing to consider whether garnishment
for family support obligations is to be precluded by ERISA. The
following quote from Cogollos v. Cogollos, 53 decided by the Supreme Court of New York, indicated in no uncertain terms the attitude of the Courts in this regard:
Until and unless Congress had made it plain that it intended the
absurd, unfair and unconscionable result contended for by the
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 119.
IRC § 401(a)(13) (1986).
592 F.2d at 121.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 123.
468 F. Supp. 466.
Id. at 123.
The Retirement Equity Act, Pub. L. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1978).
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movant upon reargument, the Court will not leave the field, and
will permit the normal and routine enforcement machinery with
respect to outstanding support orders to function."'
In the case of Stone v. Stone,5 5 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1980, concluded that the entire matter had been put to
rest by the United States Supreme Court in the case of In Re Marriage of Campa.5" In Campa, the Supreme Court declined to hear a
case which allowed state court action against pension benefits, for
want of a substantial federal question.57 The Ninth Circuit view
indicated preemption of state court orders was not the intent of
5 8
Congress and state court action was still a distinct possibility.
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor have long since abandoned their initial position with regard to
preemption of the broadly encompassing anti-alienation provisions
application. 9 In the appellate decision of AT&T v. Merry,60 the
Department of Justice had filed, on behalf of both the Secretary of
Revenue and the Secretary of Labor, amicus curiae briefs and participated in an oral argument in support of the implied exception
for family support obligations. In 1980, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 80-27,"' which concluded that a qualified retirement plan would not lose its qualified status if the benefits for a participant in pay status were ordered to be paid to the
spouse or children of the participant pursuant to state court order.2 Citing several of the cases that had been handed down at
that point, the ruling concluded that the anti-assignment rule
".* was not intended to defeat the enforcement of the obligation
of a plan participant to support the spouse or children of the par54. Id. at 930.
55. 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir., 1980). In Stone, the Department of Labor took the
position that state community property laws were superceded by ERISA. The
same brief acknowledged, however, that an attachment could be made of benefits
in pay status under state community property laws. The brief is reprinted in BNA
Pension Reporter #221, January 8, 1979.
56. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
57. Id. at
58. Stone, 632 F.2d at 742.
59. In the Stone case, the Internal Revenue Service and Department of Labor supported the idea of an implied exception. They also supported this concept
in AT&T v. Merry, Note 59, and the Revenue Ruling cited at Note 60.
60. 592 F.2d 118.
61. Rev. Rul. 80-27. 1980-1 C.B. 85.
62. Id.
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ticipant through alimony or support payments."6
VI.

INTRODUCTION OF THE

QDRO

With this background, Congress, in 1983, began to consider
what eventually became the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA).
The initial legislative history, ignored such rough spots as the decision of the New York Court of Appeals described above,"' and
stated that under the present law, benefits are subject to a spendthrift provision required by ERISA and, furthermore, ERISA
superceded state laws relating to retirement plans.6 5 The legislative
history cited various court decisions which concluded that the antiassignment provision was not intended to apply to support obligations. The history further stated that the intent of the applicable
provisions of REA was to clarify that spendthrift provisions by allowing only certain domestic relations orders under the statute being developed. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO)
would not be considered an assignment or alienation of benefits
67
prohibited by ERISA
Section 401(a)(13)(B), enacted as part of REA, appears to
have at least settled one highly disputed matter. It specifically
states that subparagraph (A), the General Anti-Assignment and
Alienation Provision applies ". . . to the creation, assignment, or
recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic relations order .. ."' An exception to this rule is made for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order
as defined in the statute6 9
Obviously, from the foregoing language, it appears that an order of a domestic relations court, not meeting the statutory definition of QDRO and made incident to a marital dispute, would be
one of the prohibited assignments. Unfortunately, the statute does
not clearly define what court ordered assignment of benefits will be
considered as being made pursuant to a domestic relations order.
Practitioners are still left with the dichotomy of thought as exemplified in NationalBank of North America v. InternationalBroth63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
National Bank of N. Am. v. Int'l Bhd., 419 N.Y.S. 127.
5 REP. No. 98-57, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(B)(1986).
Id.
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erhood of Electrical Workers. 0 In that case, the majority view was
that a simple execution to enforce an otherwise valid judgment was
not relevant to the administration or regulation of employee benefit plans. 71 Therefore, the judgment was not within the ambit of
the preemption rules of ERISA. The question of whether
401(a)(13)(B) would apply in the case of a simple contract action
based upon a separation agreement or on a promissory note issued
incident to an otherwise valid domestic relations order is left
unanswered.
Nevertheless, the Retirement Equity Act creates a haven of
relative certainty by specifically exempting the QDRO from the
anti-alienation provisions. First of all, it should be noted that the
QDRO, by definition, is an exception to the anti-alienation rules of
section 401(a)(13).72 Since it is a part of section 401 of the Code, it
relates only to qualified plans and plans subject to the vesting requirements of section 411 of the Code. Since the anti-assignment
rules do not apply to individual retirement accounts, government
and church plans, or other ERISA exempt plans, the QDRO does
not apply to such plans. 73 The QDRO is defined in section 414(p)
of the Internal Revenue Code. The following is a brief description
of the requirements that an order must meet in order to constitute
a QDRO.74
A. What Orders Are Covered
A Qualified Domestic Relations Order is the order of a court
made pursuant to a state domestic relations law relating to the
provision of child support, alimony, or marital property rights to a
spouse, former spouse, child or dependent of a participant. As
may be inferred from the definition, the QDRO must constitute a
court order. It may not take the form of an agreement between the
parties, though it may be, pursuant to a consent order or similar
agreement, reduced to a judgment. Under the statute, the QDRO
must create or recognize the right of an alternate payee to benefits
otherwise payable to the participant. A QDRO must follow a prescribed procedural format in order to meet the requirements of the
statute. The order must clearly state the following:
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

419 N.Y.S. 2d 127.
Id. at 129.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1986).
I.R.C. § 414 (p) (1986).

Id.
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1. Name and last know mailing address of the participant
and the mailing address of each alternate payee. The
committee reports indicate that a QDRO will still qualify notwithstanding the fact that it does not designate
the alternate payee's current mailing address if the plan
administrator has reason to know the address independently of the order.
2. The amount or percentage of the participant's benefit
required to be paid to the alternate payee or the manner in which such amount is to be determined, the
number of payments and the period involved, as well as
each plan to which the order applies.
The QDRO provision of REA was effective on January 1, 1985.
Under the statute, if an order was entered before that date and
benefits were being paid on January 1, 1985, the plan administrator is obligated to treat the order as qualified. A plan administrator
is permitted to treat any other order as qualified if it was entered
into January 1, 1985 even though benefits were not yet being
paid.75
B.

Form of Benefit

One of the principal questions that was left unanswered by the
plethora of cases decided prior to REA was whether a court could
order the benefit paid in a form not otherwise avalable under the
plan. Revenue Ruling 80-2711 attempted to deal with this question
by stating that the implied exception for marital and support
rights can be recognized only in the case of benefits in pay status
since there was no right under the plan to benefits not in pay
status."
Section 414(p)(3) specifically deals with this issue. It states
that a QDRO may not require payment in a form not otherwise
provided for under the plan or require increased benefits. 8 In addition, the QDRO may not require payment of benefits to an alternate payee once such benefits are required to be paid to another
alternate payee under a prior order.7 9
Section 414(p)(4) contains a major exception to the foregoing
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

I.R.C. § 414 (p) (1986).
Rev. Rul. 80-27, 1980-1 C.B. 85.
Id.
I.R.C. § 414 (p) (3) (1986).
Id.
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description on modification of benefits. Under that provision, a
QDRO may require payment of benefits to the alternate payee
before the participant has separated from service on or after the
date on which the participant attains (or would have attained) the
earliest retirement age under the plan.80 In such a case, benefits
which may be assigned pursuant to the QDRO, are actuarially determined based upon accruals to that date and based on the interest rate assumptions under the plan or, if there is no interest rate
assumption, five percent.8 ' Many plans lack an early retirement
date. Section 414(p)(4)(B), nevertheless, may impute an early retirement date by providing that, for purposes of the QDRO statute, earliest retirement date means the earlier of the date the participant is entitled to a distribution under the plan or the later
date when the participant attains the age of fifty or the earliest
date on which the participant could begin receiving benefits under
the plan if the participant separated from service.82 If the plan
does not provide for payment of benefits until attainment of normal retirement age, regardless of separation from service, the
QDRO cannot commence payment to the alternate payee until the
participant attains or would have attained normal retirement age.83
C.

Required Plan Procedures

Each plan administrator is required to promptly notify the
participant and each alternate payee upon receipt of a domestic
relations order. 8 ' The plan administrator is also required to adopt
reasonable procedures in order to enable it to determine whether a
domestic relations order is a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.85
During the period of such determination, the plan administrator is
required to separately account for the amounts which would have
otherwise been payable to the alternate payee had the order been
determined to be a QDRO. 86 The plan administrator has a maximum period of eighteen months from the date the first payment
would have been made to the alternate payee to determine
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 414(p)(4)(B) (1986).
§ 414(p)(4)(A) (1986).
§ 414(p)(4)(B) (1986).
§ 414(p)(4)(A) (1986).
§ 414(p)(6)(A)(i) (1986).
§ 414(p)(6)(B) (1986).
§ 414(p)(7)(A) (1986).
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whether the order is a QDRO. 7 If the plan administrator does not
resolve that question within the eighteen month period, or determines that the order is not a QDRO, the separately accounted for
funds must be paid to the plan participant or the other person who
would have been entitled to payment had there been no Domestic
Relations Order. 88 If there is a determination, made after the eighteen month period, that an order is a QDRO, the payments may be
made prospectively only.8 9 As clarified by the 1986 Act, if, during
the eighteen month period, the order is determined not to be a
QDRO and the administrator receives notice that either party is
attempting to rectify the deficiency, the plan administrator may
hold the benefits until expiration of the eighteen month period or
rectification of the deficiency, whichever occurs first.'0
D. Taxation of Benefits
One of the truly frightening aspects of the pre-REA cases is
that they never fully addressed the question of taxability of benefits. Before REA, it was possible that a court ordered award of
benefits to a spouse could result in taxation to the plan participant. These benefits could not be rolled over to an Individual Retirement Account.' 1 Such a distribution could have resulted in a
penalty tax for early distributions and could have prevented the
participant from otherwise being entitled to lump sum distribution
preferential tax treatment. IRC section 402(a)(9) now provides
that the alternate payee, assuming that the payee is the spouse or
former spouse of the participant, be treated as the distributee for
tax purposes.'2 This rule does not apply if the alternate payee is a
child of the participant. Any distribution and discharge of the support obligation to the child will result in taxation to the
participant."
Pursuant to the provisions of section 402(a)(7)(F), the alternate payee under QDRO will be eligible to rollover the amount received to an eligible retirement plan as defined in the statute.' 4 In
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(B) (1986).
I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(C) (1986).
I.R.C. § 414(p)(7)(D) (1986).
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-387, 98 Stat. 1447 (1984).
No Provisions for QDRO rollovers were made in I.R.C. § 402.
I.R.C. § 402(a)(9) (1986).
Id.
I.R.C. § 402(a)(6) (1986).
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addition, once a QDRO has been entered, the amount payable to
the alternate payee will not be taken into account in determining
whether the participant is eligible for any favorable tax treatment
applicable to lump sum distributions. The alternate payee will
not, however, be eligible for such special tax treatment.9 The committee reports indicate that an alternate payee will not be required
to meet the sixty day rollover period otherwise applicable to participants.97 Many commentators, however, caution alternative payees to make the rollover within the sixty day period to insure tax
deferral. 8
In addition, the penalty tax on distributions prior to age fifty
nine and one-half, does not apply to distributions received pursuant to a QDRO. 99 Prior to passage of REA there was concern as to
who would be taxed upon distribution of retirement benefits to the
alternate payee.100 In Letter Ruling 7952045, dated September 25,
1979, it was held that an employee spouse was treated as the taxpayer and instructions were given that Form 1099-R be issued in
his or her name. This was changed by Letter Ruling 8309144 issued on December 6, 1982. It held that the employee spouse would
not be taxed on the distribution to the nonemployee spouse. The
private ruling declined to rule on whether the employer must issue
Form 1099-R to the nonemployee spouse. This was all corrected by
the changes in section 402(a) and section 72 of the Code by
REA. 101
Distributions to an alternate payee are not otherwise exempted from the minimum distribution requirements, though distributions to the alternate payee are deemed distributed for such
purposes.102 Section 402(a)(5)(D)(I) provides that property transferred to an alternate payee may be transferred or rolled over to an
eligible retirement plan within the same tax year, thereby defer95. I.R.C. § 402(a)(7) (1986); I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(B) (1986).
96. S. Rep. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 20 (1984); Retirement Equity Act
of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1448 (1984).
97. Id.
98. 240 Pens. & Profit Sharing (P-H) Paragraph 11.
99. I.R.C. § 402(a)(9).
100. None of the early court cases dealt with this issue and practioners were,
therefore, afraid that the plan participant would be taxed on benefits ordered
paid to a spouse.
101. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426-55
(1984); I.R.C. § 402(a) (1986); I.R.C. § 72 (1986).
102. Proposed Treasury Regulations 1-401(a)(9)-IH.
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ring the tax.10 3

VII.

THE IMPLIED EXCEPTION - WHAT IS LEFT AFTER

REA?

With the obvious recognition by Congress of the problem that
existed and the concomitant passage of REA, it would not be unreasonable to expect the controversy regarding the anti-alienation
provisions of ERISA to have been finalized. After all, had not Congress, in its commitee reports, clearly identified the preemption
concept as it relates to the anti-alienation provision, thereby carving out one precisely defined and narrow exception? Moreover, one
of the initial drafts of REA contained language specifically rendering null and void any attempted assignments, alienations, levies,
etc., of plan benefits.104 Unfortunately, this language was not
adopted as a part of the final statute and the torturous hunt for
the unidentified but wistfully sought legislative exceptions
continue.
A.

Only Congress Can Create Exceptions?

In 1985, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to
continue its logic of the AT&T v. Merry'0 5 case and again find an
implied exception where a contrary holding would lead to clear injustice. The case, Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v. Irving
Trust Company,10 6 involved a former employee of Bache & Company who had pled nolo contendere to numerous counts of grand
theft and securities fraud while he was a broker. 10 7 The defendant,
Mr. Kalil, executed a voluntary assignment to Ellis National Bank
in satisfaction of judgments that the bank had against Kalil. 0 8
That voluntary assignment qualified under the original ERISA
anti-alienation exceptions.10 9 Bache, however, claimed a right to
proceed against Ellis' retirement funds on the theory that these
funds were deposited to the retirement account from funds derived
from fraudulent practices which Bache was obligated to restore to
103.
104.
(1985).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

I.R.C. § 402(a)(5)(D)(i) (1986).
3 S. YOUNG & M. BENDER, PENSION

AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS,

at 12-13

592 F.2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1979).
786 F.2d 466 (2nd Cir. 1986).
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id. at 468.
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its customers."1 0 Specifically, Bache argued for another implied exception; this one in the case of traceable stolen funds.
In its denial of Bache's plea, the Second Circuit, affirming the
lower court, cited four reasons for its decision, some of which
would seem to be mere invitations to reargument of the same issues in subsequent cases. First, the court referenced a Florida
State Court proceeding which had ordered Kalil to make restitution to customers who had lost funds. 1 The court felt that it was
important that the order of restitution was for the benefit of defrauded customers alone and not merely for Bache. 1 ' From this,
the court assumed that the state's interest in restoring losses of
crime victims may be as significant as the state's interest in regulating domestic matters, but was not involved in this case. It would
not seem unrealistic, however, for the state court to have concluded that the brokerage house was a victim of the same crime
and ordered restitution of funds that it lost as a result of the fraud.
The second reason for the decision of the Second Circuit was
that the fundamental purposes of ERISA were furthered by providing an implied exception in the case of domestic relations matters." 3 The purpose set forth in ERISA, of protecting employees
and their beneficiaries, was concluded to be served by reducing the
number of public charges that would result were the beneficiaries
denied access to retirement funds. 114 Could not the same argument
be made to prevent persons guilty of fraud from benefiting from
their acts?
The third reason for denying the existence of the implied exception was that the arguments of Bache did not come recommended by the Department of Labor or the Department of the
Treasury. 5 As previously pointed out, the government did not initially support the exception for domestic relations orders. In addition, these two branches of government are responsible for enforcing ERISA and do so primarily by promulgation of their own
regulations. No authority for giving much weight to the government's mere failure to speak out is cited.
The fourth and final argument set forth by the court of appeals is that there are few cases supporting the theft or fraud ex110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.

Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471.
Id.
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ception." 6 If a plebiscite were the appropriate method for deciding cases of this nature, the entire implied exception doctrine
should have died with General Motors v. Townsend."'
The summation of the Second Circuit, however, goes to the
heart of the problem in recognizing implied exceptions. Once this
starts, where does it stop? As the Ellis court states "[w]ould the
exception be available to only employers or pension plans, or also
to third parties allegedly victimized, such as creditors, the government or even other employees?"" 8 The court then goes on to conclude that the burden is upon Congress to make exceptions if exceptions are going to be made. " 9
A result similar to that in Ellis National Bank was reached by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in the case of Vink v. SHV North American Holding Corp.20
That case involved a particularly heinous situation where the former employee had, over a period of years, taken many thousands
of dollars in illegal kickbacks and diverted more than three million
dollars of company business to dummy corporations that the employee had set up. After pleading guilty to several criminal counts
and being sentenced to fourteen months in prison, Mr. Vink applied for his pension benefits.12 ' The company argued for an implied exception saying that Congress could not have intended to
require a company to make payments under circumstances such as
these, especially since the result of the payments would be to reduce the retirement benefits of other faithful and honest
employees.'
The principal arguments in the Vink case against creation of
the implied exception related not to the anti-assignment provisions
of ERISA but to the so-called anti-"bad boy" clause of section
203.123 This section requires non-forfeitable rights except under
very narrow circumstances."" The court stated that it was not entirely clear which of these ERISA sections was involved but that it
really made no difference and that it could not create a fraud ex116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
468 F. Supp. 466.
Ellis Nat'l Bank, 786 F.2d at 471.
Id. at 472.
549 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Id. at 269.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 270.
Id.
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ception in the case of disloyal employees. 2 5 According to the court,
this was a decision that Congress would have to make. 126 The Vink
case cited a similar conclusion reached in Winer v. Edison Brothers Stores Pension Plan'27 which was decided in 1978 by the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The contributions by the foregoing decisions to the cause of
certainty in the application of the anti-alienation provisions, is
however, muted by the fact that they represent merely one of two
grossly divergent points of view. Other courts have dealt with this
issue and have chosen to recognize an implied exception under
128
similar circumstances.
B.

Implied Exception for Dishonesty Found

In the case of Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Cox, 2 9 the insurance company, as surety for a bank that
the defendant had defrauded, attempted to garnish the pension
benefits of the defendant, Mr. Cox.' 3 0 The lower court allowed the
garnishment stating that the wrongdoer should not profit by his
own misdeeds.' 3' The court of appeals affirmed.132 In doing so, the
court cited the general principles used to establish ERISA and
concluded as follows:
These standards are intended to protect the employee against
mismanagement or the provision of misinformation by the employer. The legislation provides no indication whatsoever that it
is intended to protect the employee against the consequences of
his own misdeeds.1 33
125. Id. at 273.
126. Id.
127. 593 F.2d 307 (8th Cir., 1979). See also United Metal Products Corp. v.
National Bank of Detroit, 811 F.2d 297 (6th Cir., 1987). Petition for Certiorari has
been filed in this case. The Soliciter General has been invited to file a brief seting
forth the position of the United States, 97 L.Ed.2d 760 (1987).
128. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Cox, note 121 infra; Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers, National Pension Fund, note 126 infra;
Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., note 136 infra; Crawford v. LaBoucherie Bernard Ltd., note 141 infra.
129. 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985).
130. Id at 551.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 552.
133. Id.
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C. Implied Exception to Protect Other Federal Statutes Found
The United States District Court for Colorado dealt with a
similar situation in the case of Guidry v. National Sheet Metal
Workers National Pension Fund.' The case involved Mr. Guidry,
the chief executive officer of the union and a trustee of the pension
fund, who had been found guilty of embezzlement. 3 5 He applied
for retirement benefits. He was denied on the theory that a constructive trust was imposed until the embezzled funds had been
repaid. 136 Mr. Guidry argued that, in adopting REA, Congress had
created only one exception. Implying another exception would fly
13
in the face of the clearly expressed intent of Congress.
The court cited both the Ellis National Bank'38 case and the
Saint Paul Fire and Marine"9 case and concluded that the problem at hand involved interpreting the effect of ERISA upon other
labor laws; and, more particularly, the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947140 as well as the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959.41 In enacting these two statutes, the
court concluded, that Congress has attempted to protect employees from improper practices of employers and their own unions
and that this purpose would not be served by permitting other employees of the union to be damaged by the "knavery" of Mr.
Guidry. 1 2
D. Implied Exception Found Where the Offense is Against the
Plan
Perhaps the most egregious circumstance occurs in the case of
plan participants who serve as fiduciaries and who divert plan assets for their own benefit. If these participants are then permitted
to hide behind the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA and collect
their plan benefits as if nothing had happened, the old adage that
crime does not pay would be disproven. Nevertheless, no exception
is stated for this situation in either the statute or the regulations.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

641 F. Supp. 360 (D. Colo., 1986).
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id. at 362.
786 F.2d 466 (2nd Cir., 1986).
752 F.2d 550.
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
Guidry, 641 F. Supp. at 363.
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Therefore, it is left, for the courts to find yet another implied exception to prevent unjust enrichment of the criminal.
Such was the case in the Seventh Circuit Decision of Fremont
v. McGraw-Edison Company.1 3 Fremont involved three employees
who had admittedly engaged in theft of company property at vari44
ous times prior to and immediately after the passage of ERISA.1
Application of the effective date of ERISA was at issue and two of
the employees were determined to be protected by section 203 of
ERISA.145 The third employee was, however, a plan fiduciary and
the company contended that the failure of the plan fiduciary to
disclose the thefts prior to the effective date of ERISA so as to
allow for a forefeiture and reallocation of plan assets was a breach
of fiduciary duty." The court held that causing a forfeiture of the
plan fiduciary's account would not be a divestiture, but would only
be a restoration of the plan to the position it would have been in
4
were it not for that breach.' 1
Perhaps the ultimate extension of this logic is found in the
case of Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd.148 Crawford involved a plan fiduciary who diverted several hundred thousand
149
dollars of plan assets to a partnership and corporation he owned.
Judgments aggregating nearly one million dollars were entered
against the plan fiduciary and were not paid.1 50 On motion of the
plaintiffs, the court ordered the plan fiduciary's own plan account
forfeited in partial satisfaction of the judgment.1 5 1 The Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court decision using broad-sweeping language that opened the door for another im2
plied exception anytime a court sees injustice being done. 15
143. 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. Id. at 754.
145. Id. at 757.
146. Id. at 758.
147. Id. at 759.
148. 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, -U.S.
, 108 S. Ct. 328
(1987).
149. Id. at 118.
150. Id. at 119.
151. Id.
152. The court, quoting Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Committee, indicated that they were obligated to draw upon ". . . principles of traditional trust law. . ." and that "[tirust law contemplates the use of broad and flexible equitable remedies as means for dealing with breaches of fiduciary duty, and
it imposes the obligation upon the courts to use the remedy that is most advantageous to the participants and that will most closely effectuate the purposes of the
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The court cited other cases acknowledging the existence of implied exceptions. 153 It focused, however, upon language contained
in the 1974 Committee Reports indicating that it was the intent of
Congress to draw on traditional principles of trust law to protect
plan beneficiaries.1 4 The court went on to conclude that "the contrary interpretation would permit trustee wrongdoers to benefit
from their misdeeds at the expense of those whom ERISA was
designed to protect."15' 5 The court of appeals concluded that the
plan fiduciaries were really not being deprived of their plan benefits. In other words, the effect of the offset would be the same as if
they received the distribution they would have received had not
the plan benefits been decreased by their wrongdoing. 15
Obviously, the court's intent is to prevent manifiest injustice.
Nevertheless, the application of general equitable trust rules would
seem to open the door to a plethora of implied exceptions. Clearly,
the intent of ERISA was to protect plan participants. Could it not
be just as easily argued that this intent is fostered by the seizure of
a fiduciary's plan benefits in an account where the fiduciary has
been guilty of misappropriation of funds or dereliction of duty to
another plan entirely?

VIII.

THE FUTURE OF

ERISA

SPENDTHRIFT LANGUAGE

And now, fourteen years after the passage of ERISA, the circle
of uncertainty has been virtually completed. Both Congress and
the courts have admitted, by their subsequent actions, that the
language adopted in 1974 was, at best, unclear. Instead of jumping
in and clearly rectifying the problem, however, Congress invented
the QDRO. It did nothing whatsoever to clarify what it meant
when it adopted the original anti-alienation provision.
After all the litigation and all the subsequent legislative history and legislation, the courts are still making value judgments on
what they think Congress should have done, or would have done,
had they addressed the specific issues in question. In other words,
the courts are legislating and, as questioned by the Second Circuit,
where will they stop? 15 7 The New York Court of Appeals has found
trust." Id. at 120.
153. Id. at 121.
154. Id. at 120.
155. Id. at 121.
156. Id. at 122.
157. Ellis, 786 F.2d 466.
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an overriding public policy need to insure the enforceability of
judgments. 158 Will other states, as well as the Federal Courts of
Appeals, agree with that conclusion and will they continue to carve
out other "implied exceptions"?
Clearly, by the passage of ERISA and subsequent legislation,
Congress intended that retirement benefits be given a special status in the eyes of the law. These benefits are to provide for the
employee and the employee's beneficiaries when they can no longer
care for their own needs. They are protected and preserved from
the onslaught of both the employer and outsiders seeking to reach
the funds before they come to rest in the hands of the beneficiaries. With this objective in mind, it is suggested that Congress
give serious thought to the following course of action:
1. CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF SECTION 401 (A) (13). As
previously discussed, the statute, in its current form is merely directive to the drafters of qualified plans. The lack of self-executing
language has, by and large, been ignored by the courts. Since Congress itself apparently never considered an all-encompassing statute, the lack of affirmative direction is what created the existing
massive problems. If Congress wants specific spendthrift language
to be contained in each plan, they should give some guidelines to
the Treasury Department in the statute and direct that regulations
spell out the precise plan language that will create the appropriate
exemptions. If Congress wants the protective umbrella to be created by the federal statute itself, there is ample precedent, as previously alluded to, for doing this in clear and precise language.
2. BROADEN THE SCOPE OF SECTION 401(A)(13). The
anti-assignment provisions of ERISA apply only to qualified plans
subject to the vesting rules of section 411."'1 Individual Retirement
Accounts are not covered by their provisions. 6 0 If the objective of
the provisions are to insure that retirement benefits are available
when needed, this format does not make a lot of sense. For many
years, Individual Retirement Accounts were only available to persons not covered under an employer sponsored plan. Under current
law, with some exceptions, deductible contributions may only be
made by persons not covered by an employer sponsored plan. Persons contributing to an Individual Retirement Account look to
158. See supra note at 28.
159. I.R.C. § 414 (9) (1986).
160. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1988

25

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 2
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:29

these funds to protect them in their declining years no less than
persons covered by an employer sponsored plan.
3. DEFINE CLEARLY THE PREEMPTION OF STATE
STATUTES. REA assumed that there is a federal preemption
and has gone on to provide a very narrow exception for state action. Nevertheless, the courts are obviously confused when it
comes to a determination of precisely what state action is preempted. The New York Court of Appeals, as indicated above, has
concluded that enforcement of judgments is merely collaterally related to retirement plans and therefore not precluded by state action. 1 ' Congress should amend the appropriate legislation to provide that retirement benefits may not be the subject of execution,
levy, or seizure unless specifically provided for by federal legislation. This ban should include seizure for payment of federal taxes.
Widows and orphans are no less hungry when benefits they have
relied upon are seized to pay taxes, than they would be if the same
benefits were seized pursuant to a judgment on an installment
sales contract.
4. LIMIT THE PARAMETERS OF THE UMBRELLA. The
spendthrift provisions of ERISA, much like the exemptions afforded under the bankruptcy laws or other statutes, are clearly intended to insure sustenance to the protected individuals. They are
not designed to give those attempting to defraud their creditors a
shield to hide behind. Under present law, up to $30,000 per year
may be added to a participant's defined contribution plan account.' This amount, set aside per year, may be multiplied in the
case of maximum funding under a defined benefit plan within the
limitation of section 415.163 An individual should not be permitted
to shield unlimited amounts of money by causing the adoption of a
qualified retirement plan. A simple alternative to this would be to
provide that only an amount sufficient to provide normal retirement benefits, of "a certain number of dollars,"' ' could be
shielded behild the anti-alienation statute.
161. Morgenthau, 513 N.Y.S.2d 429.
162. I.R.C. § 415 (1986).
163. Id.
164. An alternative may be to use the limits imposed by Internal Revenue
Code § 4981A. This section has obviously been designed with the idea in mind of
ascertaining what a reasonable retirement benefit is. Currently benefits in excess
of $117,200.00 per year are deemed "excess benefits" subject to a 15% excise tax.
This figure will be increased annually to reflect cost of living increases.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol11/iss1/2
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5. OVERRULE THE CASES WITH REGARD TO OFFENSES AGAINST THE PLAN AND FRAUD AGAINST THE
EMPLOYER. The cases clearly state that they are preferring one
creditor over another. A plan sponsor that has been defrauded may
be entitled to take action against plan benefits whereas an entirely
unrelated party, who has nonetheless been defrauded, will be left
without remedy. If the objective is to prevent seizure of plan assets
needed for sustenance after retirement, then the objective should
be made consistent.
6. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, KEEP IT SIMPLE. The
magnitude of the funds expended for plan administrators, attorneys, accountants, courts and the maintenance of government bureaucracy, to accommodate the surrealistic ramblings of Congress
in the area of qualified retirement benefits is beyond comprehension. There is no need for it and clearly Congress will be forced to
adopt the Employee Retirement Simplification Act of 19
The adoption of a clear and workable anti-alienation provision
may be the first step in this legislative catharsis. Congress could
simply state its objectives, the quantity of the exemption granted,
and the fact that its remedies, such as the QDRO, are absolutely
exclusive and offer the only means by which access to funds in the
hands of a pension administrator can be reached.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In .1974, the drafters of ERISA had an idea in mind. Fourteen
years later we still are not quite sure what that idea was. Few will
dispute the fact that the Internal Revenue Code has, over the
years, become outrageously complex and difficult to administer.
This situation is not alleviated when Congress enacts obscure legislation, and then, knowing full well that the courts are literally taking a poll as to its meaning, they fail to step in and rectify the
situation.
The various court decisions discussed above clearly acknowledge the fact that they have no language to turn to, in order to
derive the implied exceptions that have been created. Apparently,
the courts felt that they must step in to interpret this legislation,
.in order to avoid what they have perceived as a monstrous injustice. When the courts admittedly engage in the restructuring of a
statute out of whole cloth, the time has long passed for Congress to
act in a decisive manner. The creation of the QDRO, while helpful,
does not constitute this decisive action.
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Many commentators have, over these fourteen years, written
scholarly articles about the various court decisions discussed
herein. These articles, in an erudite fashion, try to define legislative intent in judicial direction but few call it what it really is,
"chaos".
Granted, the English language is not all that precise an instrument. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity in the anti-alienation statutes' legislation clauses are unnecessary. The cases cited in this article are but the tip of the iceberg in a multitude of litigation
involving anti-assignment clauses of ERISA. Literally dozens of
state and federal court decisions have been handed down involving
what is assumed to be thousands of hours of lawyers' and judges'
time and millions of dollars of taxpayers' money.
Many of these problems could have been solved by the drafting of precise statutory language in the first place. The obvious
problems which still exist may be rectified if Congress recognizes
the problem and acts to make its intention clear.
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